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INTRODUCTION

Two decades ago, the Supreme Court sought to promote more
effective, transparent patent litigation in Markman v. Westview Instruments1
by ruling that "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court."' 2 In so doing, the
Court removed interpretation of patent claims from the black box of jury
deliberations by holding that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial
did not extend to patent claim construction. Failing to find clear historical
evidence of how claim construction was handled in 179 1,' the Court turned
to "the relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory
policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation."4 It concluded that
federal district court judges were better equipped than juries to resolve the
mixed fact/law controversies inherent in construing disputed patent claim
terms, 5 thereby leading to more effective and transparent patent litigation.
Fully achieving the Court's goal of more effective and transparent patent
litigation, however, depends on district judges having the flexibility to learn
pertinent facts, build a reviewable record, and explain the basis for their
claim constructions.
Courts interpret patent claims from the perspective of persons having
ordinary skill in the art as of the time of the invention.6 Since few judges
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brief in Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2014) [ht
L_.perma.cc/AU5N-

FZ62]. That brief drew upon J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2014)

[blp erma cc/MFA5-HXAX].
1 517 U.S. 370 (1996) [leit.sprnma.cci2BDS-SPRY].
2 Id. at 372.

3 Id. at 376-84 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment,

57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640-643 (1973) [hqp./erma.cc/4BYA-324K]; Tull v. United States, 481 U.S.
412, 417 (1987) [tps:perma.cc/87KF-HJMV]) (explaining that under the "historical test," the Court
examines whether a cause of action was tried at law (or was analogous to a cause of action tried at law)
at the time of the founding of the nation).
4 Id. at 384.
5 Id. at 388-90.
6 See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
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have such training and knowledge, they must step into the shoes of skilled
artisans. As Professor William Callyhan Robinson explained more than a
century ago, the court may look to:
[T]estimony to explain the meaning of its language, or to expert evidence to
ascertain the essential characteristics of the described invention and the
differences between it and other patented inventions, or to papers in the Patent
Office which are connected with the patent ... to show the significance which
[the inventor] attached to the terms.7
Thus, when parties dispute the skilled artisan's interpretation of patent
claim meaning, resolution of the controversy appears to have a factual
character.
Unfortunately, Markman's promise of more effective and transparent
patent adjudication has been frustrated by the Federal Circuit's adherence to
de novo review of all aspects of district judges' claim determinations,
including how skilled artisans understand patent claim terms.8 This standard
has had the perverse effect of dissuading district judges from holding
evidentiary hearings or explaining the reasoning behind their claim
constructions. 0 The Federal Circuit's view that claim construction is a pure
question of law has instead focused district judges' attention on reading and

[https:/penna.cc/RAZ8-VWRJT].
7 3 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 248 (1890).
8 See, e.g., Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir.

2014) (en banc), vac 'd and remanded sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting
Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.) [https/_/perma.cc/K84J-FNFVP]; Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) [htps://perma.cc/X2QH-T4DD].
9 Commenting on the high reversal rate for claim construction, one district court judge has observed
that "you might as well throw darts." See Anandashankar Mazumdar, FederalDistrict Courts Need
Experts that Are Good 'Teachers,'Judges Tell Bar, 70 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 536,

537 (Sept. 16, 2005) (quoting Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Washington). See generally J. Jonas Anderson and Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A
Historical,Empirical,and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5
(2014) [hereinafter Informal Deference] [litppermna.cc!MFAS-HXAX].

10 See, e.g., Hollingsworth & Vose Filtration Ltd. v. Delstar Techs., Inc., No. 10-788 GMS (D. Del.
Jul. 10, 2012), available at http:/ www.scribd.com/doc/100456939/Hollingsworth-Vose-Filtration-Ltdv-Delstar-Techs-Inc-C-A-No-10-788-GMS-D-Del-Jul-10-2012 (Order Construing the Terms of U.S.
Pat. No. 6,623,548) (cursory opinion with no discussion of factual predicates, evidentiary sources, or
explication of the claim construction process; footnotes limited to discussion of intrinsic sources and
Federal Circuit jurisprudence) [hap:/perma.cc/9EAA-EJZQ]; Shelbyzyme LLC v. Genzyme Corp., No.
09-768
GMS
(D.
Del.
Jul.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.delawareiplaw.com/2011/07/chiefjudge sleet claim constr.html (Order Construing the
Terms of U.S. Pat. No. 7,011,831) (cursory opinion with a footnote summarizing Federal Circuit
precedent emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence and noting that "the parties presented
conflicting extrinsic evidence.., which the court will not consider") [hIttp:Trnarn c/Hf_97-9QEB]; In
re Rembrandt Techs., LP Patent Litig., No. 07-md-1848 GMS, 2008 WL 5773604 (D. Del. Nov. 19,
2008) (construing over 100 claim terms without setting forth any analysis in the claim construction
order).
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rereading the patent specification without the opportunity to fully and
directly engage with those most familiar and conversant with patent claim
language in its technological, industrial, and claim-drafting context. For
district judges to even intimate that they were making factual findings
invited reversal. 1
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of patent claim construction
during its current Term. Overturning two decades of Federal Circuit
practice, the Court's much anticipated decision in Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 12 clearly established that patent claim construction
can entail fact-finding and restored the fundamental juridical principlereflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6)-that the Federal
Circuit, like other appellate courts, must "give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility" and defer to the trial court's
factual determinations unless "clearly erroneous."13
Part I of this Article traces the background of the de novo review
controversy. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court's Teva decision,
analyzes the Court's logic, and then explores the case's ramifications for
patent case management in Part III. Finally, Part IV examines the interplay
between patent claim construction and claim indefiniteness, a related patent
doctrine that has recently attracted Supreme Court attention. 14
I.

THE ROOTS OF THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING DE Novo
REVIEW OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

The controversy in the Teva decision can be traced back to the rise of
patent jury trials in the 1970s and 1980s. For much of patent law's history,
patent litigators have preferred bench trials. Various factors-such as
speedier decisions, jurors' willingness to accord greater significance to a
patent's presumption of validity, dispensing with post-trial briefs and
proposed findings, the greater emphasis on excluding inadmissible
evidence, and possibly appellate courts' reluctance to disturb jury
decisions15 -led to a steep rise in the use of juries in patent cases. Juries
were used in less than 10% of patent cases prior to 1970, but by the early
1990s, that number rose to over 70%.16 The newly formed Federal Circuit,
established in 1982, saw this as an impediment to reviewing patent
11See

Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the judgment, and

joining Part IV of the en banc opinion) (suggesting that the de novo standard encourages trial judges to
"disguise the real reasons for their interpretation").
12 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015) [htpperma.cc/AU5NIFZ62].
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6); see also Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 834.
14 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) [htmstPerma ccI2JQ-

4KP4].
15 Gary M. Ropski, Constitutionaland ProceduralAspects of the Use of Juries in PatentLitigation
(Part ), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 609, 612-13 (1976).
16 Informal Deference, supranote 9, at 18-21.
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decisions consistently.17 The critical issue of claim construction was
shrouded in the mystery of jury deliberations.
A. The Markman Decision: Trial Judges and Claim Construction
The Federal Circuit considered this impediment to transparency in its
en banc Markman decision.18 Some Federal Circuit judges assumed that if
claim construction involved factual issues, then the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial prevented a district judge from construing the patent
claim.19 The majority opinion, however, worked around the Seventh
Amendment impediment by holding that the construction of a patent claim
is a pure question of law,20 which had the effect of allocating responsibility
to construe patents to the district judge. It also meant that the district
judge's construction of the claim was subject to de novo review.21 The court
masked the inherently factual nature of claim construction by reasoning that
although the trial judge may use both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in
construing claims:
[E]n route to pronouncing the meaning of claim language as a matter of law
based on the patent documents themselves, the court is not crediting certain
evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather,
the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence to assist in its construction of the
written document, a task it is required to perform.22
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's conclusion that the
Seventh Amendment did not require claim construction to be allocated to
juries, but through very different reasoning.23 The Court held that the
district judge should be responsible for claim construction based on judges'
"training in exegesis [of written instruments],"24 notwithstanding what it
characterized as the "mongrel [or mixed fact/law] practice" of patent claim
construction.25 In a critical passage, the Court explained:
[C]redibility judgments have to be made about the experts who testify in patent
cases, and in theory there could be a case in which a simple credibility
judgment would suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was
17 See Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudencefor the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1238-39 (1994) [hap__perma.cc/LU45-

HBA5].
18 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
[htp erma cc/ SCLU-GEZ7].
19 See id. at 992-98 (Mayer, J.,
concurring); 1010-17 (Newman, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 98387 (majority opinion).
20 Id.at 978-79.
21 Id. at 979.

22 Id. at 981 (italics in original) (footnote omitted).
23 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
24 Id. at 388.

25 Id.at 378.
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equally consistent with a patent's internal logic. But our own experience with
document construction leaves us doubtful that trial courts will run into many
cases like that. In the main, we expect, any credibility determinations will be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole document,
required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a
way that comports with the instrument as a whole. Thus, in these cases a jury's
capabilities to evaluate demeanor, to sense the "mainsprings of human
conduct," or to reflect community standards, are much less significant than a
trained ability to evaluate the testimony in relation to the overall structure of
the patent. The decisionmaker vested with the task of construing the patent is
in the better position to ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully
comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent's
internal coherence. We accordingly think there is sufficient reason to treat
construction of terms of art like many other responsibilities that we cede to a
judge in the normal course of trial, notwithstanding its evidentiary
underpinnings.26
In contrast to the Federal Circuit's Markman opinion, the Supreme
Court did not deem patent claim construction purely a question of law.
Rather, consistent with its characterization of claim construction as a
"mongrel practice," the Court noted merely that claim construction was a
27
matter "exclusively within the province of the court.
Barely two weeks after the Supreme Court's Markman ruling, a
Federal Circuit panel in another case heavily discounted the use of extrinsic
evidence, warning that "[a]llowing the public record to be altered or
changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony,
would make this right meaningless. '2' By contrast, other Federal Circuit
opinions viewed claim construction as a mixed question of law and fact for
which fact-finding could be set aside only upon a showing of clear error.29

B.

The Cybor and Phillips Decisions: Adhering to De Novo Review

This split precipitated the Federal Circuit's en banc review of the
appellate claim construction standard in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies,
Inc.3" In a sharply divided decision, a majority of the Federal Circuit
reaffirmed its view that claim construction is a pure question of law subject
to de novo review and downplayed the Supreme Court's more limited
characterization of claim construction as simply an "issue for the judge, not
26 Id.at 389-90 (citations omitted).
27 Id.at 372.
28 Vitronics

Corp.

v.

Conceptronic,

Inc.,

90

F.3d

1576,

1583

(Fed.

Cir.

1996)

[hq:rpeima.cc/FQQ2-K65H].
29 See, e.g., Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d 534, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
[https:Hperma.cc/R7VB-852H]; Metaullics Sys. Co. v. Cooper, 100 F.3d 938, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

[hs:/perma.cc/7MHZ -67NA].
30 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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the jury."31 In the majority's view, "[n]othing in the Supreme Court's
opinion supports the view that the Court endorsed a silent, third optionthat claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying questions of
fact."3 The majority discounted the Supreme Court's characterization of
claim construction as a "'mongrel practice ... fall[ing] somewhere between
a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact' as merely "prefatory
comments."33 It also overlooked the Supreme Court's statement that "there
is sufficient reason to treat construction of terms of art like many other
responsibilities that we cede to a judge in the normal course of trial,
notwithstanding its evidentiary underpinnings."34 Yet "[c]ourts commonly
recite the deferential 'abuse of discretion' test as broadly and generally
appropriate on review of evidence calls."35
While properly emphasizing the primacy of intrinsic evidence to claim
construction, the Vitronics and Cybor line of cases steered district judges
away from learning from skilled artisans and using evidentiary techniques
for resolving disputes among proffered experts. Following the Cybor
36
decision, the unusually high reversal rate for claim construction rulings
3
7
38
reached 44.2% on a per claim term basis in 2004, signaling dissensus.
In an effort to address the inconsistency across its own decisions and
quell the widespread dissatisfaction among district judges and practitioners
with its claim construction jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit granted en
banc review of a wide range of claim construction questions in Phillips v.
A WH Corp.39 Although the en banc order inviting briefs listed the standard
31 Compare id. at 1455, 1456 (concluding that "the standard of review in [the Federal Circuit's
Markman decision] ... was not changed by the Supreme Court's decision..., and we therefore
reaffirm that, as a purely legal question, we review claim construction de novo on appeal including any
allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction") with Markman, 517 U.S. at 391.
32 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1455. It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court's characterization of claim
construction as a "mongrel practice" did not support the third option.
33 Id.(quotingMarkman,517 U.S. at 378,
388).
34 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
35 Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer:FederalCivil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267,
289

(2005).
36 See Kimberly A. Moore, Markruan Eight Years Later: Is Claim ConstructionMore Predictable?,

9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 232-34 (2005) [h tp/erma.cc/9AKZ-RSF7].
37 Informal Deference, supranote 9, at 40-41.
38 The panel decision in Texas DigitalSystems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed.
Cir.

2002) [https://perma.cc/6ADH-C6V3] sought to further clarify the claim construction framework by
recognizing dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises as "particularly useful resources to assist the court
in determining the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms" due to their public availability and
objectivity. Id. at 1202. The court noted that, unlike expert testimony, these reference sources are not
"colored by the motives of the parties" or "inspired by litigation." Id. at 1203. "Indeed, these materials
may be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better understanding both the
technology and the terminology used by those skilled in the art to describe the technology." Id. Yet the
reversal rate continued to rise after the Texas Digital decision. See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at

41.
39 376 F.3d 1382 (per curiam) [!Lt

erma.cc/FNB8-8PM4].
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of appellate review among the seven questions presented,40 the majority
opinion ultimately sidestepped the issue. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit
appeared to backtrack from Vitronics skepticism of the use of extrinsic
evidence. The majority in Phillips authorized district judges to consider
extrinsic evidence, but deemed such evidence to be less significant and
reliable in determining the scope of claim terms.41 The majority recognized
that expert testimony can be useful:
[T]o provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an
invention works, to ensure that the court's understanding of the technical
aspects of the patent is consistent with that of a person of skill in the art, or to
establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has a particular
meaning in the pertinent field. However, conclusory, unsupported assertions
by experts as to the definition of a claim term are not useful to a court.4 2
While the ultimate Phillips decision formally retained the de novo
standard, the reversal rate dropped precipitously the week that the Phillips
argument was heard and has remained approximately one-third below the
pre-Phillips reversal rate. 43 Even though a majority of Federal Circuit
judges were unwilling to reverse the Cybor de novo standard, our analysis
reveals that by mid-2005 a consensus emerged among members of the court
that the court should ratchet back appellate scrutiny of claim construction
determinations.44 The indications supporting this inference include: (1) the
reversal rate dropped well before any district court cases that could have
been influenced by the Phillips decision reached the Federal Circuit,45 (2)
the rate dropped for all members of the Federal Circuit, 46 (3) the rate fell
across all technology fields except one (business methods-which could be
explained by the hand-wringing over patent eligibility that ultimately led to
the Bilski 47 and Alice4' decisions), 4 and (4) the rate of summary affirmances
substantially increased following Phillips.°

40 Id. at 1383.

41 Phillips
[

v.

AWH

Corp.,

415

F.3d

1303,

1317-18

(Fed. Cir.

2005)

(en

banc)

/h era.cc/6A6L oEH87].
42 Id. at 1318 (citations omitted).
43 Informal Deference, supranote 9, at 61 fig. 10.
44 See id. at 56-62.

45 See id. at61.
46 See id. at49-51.

47 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) [hpspcna.cc/2 _U-UKNQ], aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) [htps://perma.cc/LW6Z-VE/A].
48 CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) [https:/perma.cc/6DUPTHNM], aff'd on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) [hjp .p/ma.cc/ CSB-58'A].
49 See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 51-54.
50 See id. at 54-55.
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C. The Road to Teva
The division among Federal Circuit judges over the standard of
appellate review continued to resurface over the past decade. 1 Patent claim
construction arises in many patent appeals, which forced members of the
court to confront their differing approaches. In addition, the 2010
appointment of Judge Kathleen O'Malley brought a trial judge's
perspective to the
Federal Circuit for the first time in the appellate
52
tribunal's history.
In 2013, the Federal Circuit granted en banc review of the standard of
appellate review of claim construction rulings in Lighting Ballast Control
LLC v. Philips Electronics North America Corp.3 Many thought the court
would finally rectify the split over appellate review of claim construction.
In a surprising opinion-in which several Federal Circuit judges who had
previously questioned the Cybor de novo standard now voted to perpetuate
its application-a majority of the court upheld the standard on stare decisis
grounds. 4 In a vigorous dissent, Judge O'Malley, joined by Chief Judge
Rader and Judges Reyna and Wallach, castigated the majority for
"misapprehend[ing] the Supreme Court's guidance, contraven[ing] the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and add[ing] considerable uncertainty and
expense to patent litigation."55 While the petition for certiorari in Lighting
Ballast was pending, the Supreme Court granted review of the standard of
appellate review of claim construction rulings in Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.
II. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC. V. SANDOZ: RESTORING THE
PROPER APPELLATE ROLE

Teva

Pharmaceuticals,

the

owner

of

a

patent

covering

the

manufacturing method for Copaxone, a multiple sclerosis drug, filed suit
51

See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2011) (O'Malley, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) [https :penacc/BE5V-QWQD],
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 833 (2013) (mem.) [htpsj.perma.cc/TNMK6-KE4]; Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v.
eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) [htps:perma.cc/L4HN-UKU3]; id. at 1363-64
(Clark, District Judge (E.D. Tex.), concurring); Medegen MMS, Inc. v. ICU Med., Inc., 317 F. App'x
982, 988-91 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Walker, Chief District Judge (N.D. Cal.), dissenting) (urging greater

deference) [hap_//pe rma.cc/79MIW-BBZ2]; Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d
1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel, C.J., joined by Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc) [hqfl.s jerma.cc!TEGV-7XXE].
52 See David Ingram and Mike Scarcella, White House Rolls Out Two More CircuitNominees, THE
BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 10, 2010), http://legaltimes.typepad.comblt2010/03/white-

house -rolls-out-two -more -circuit-nominee s.html [httpria.cc/2 QFV-GKAU].
53 500 F. App'x 951 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
54 Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1276-77 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (en banc), vac 'd and remanded sub nom. Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Universal Lighting
Techs., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015) (mem.).
55 Id. at 1297 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
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against Sandoz and several other firms seeking to market generic versions
of the drug. Sandoz defended on the grounds that the patent was invalid
because Copaxone's active ingredient, characterized as having "a molecular
weight of 5 to 9 kilodaltons," was indefinite. 56 The patent did not specify
how molecular weight was determined and hence was "not amenable to
construction or... insolubly ambiguous," 57 the Federal Circuit's
indefiniteness standard at the time.58
Sandoz contended that there were three methods to determine this
weight-the weight of the most prevalent molecule, the weight as
calculated by the average weight of all molecules, or weight as calculated
by an average in which heavier molecules count for more-and therefore
Teva's failure to specify a precise meaning rendered the claim insolubly
ambiguous. 59 After considering conflicting expert evidence, the district
judge credited the testimony of Teva's expert in concluding that "a skilled
artisan would understand that the term 'molecular weight' is the weight of
the most prevalent molecule.60 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the
district judge's claim construction de novo and concluded that the claim
term in question was insolubly ambiguous.61
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari on the issue of the standard
of appellate review in patent claim construction.6 2 Justice Breyer's majority
opinion began with reference to the Court's 1996 Markman decision, noting
that the Teva case "involve[d] claim construction with 'evidentiary
underpinnings, 116 an issue that the Federal Circuit downplayed in its
adherence to the Circuit's own framework. Justice Breyer then crisply set
forth the operative principle governing appellate review, holding that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) requires a court of appeals to
uphold a district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.64
The opinion then emphasized that this "clear command" applies to all of the
courts of appeals and "does not make exceptions or purport to exclude

56 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 842 (2015). 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012)
requires that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularlypointing out and

distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention"
(emphasis added) [hpttp_/enna.cc/4A63-6MCH].
57 See Power-One, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 599 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Datamize LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
[https:Hperma.cc/94YK-MFK2]) [https:/ perma.cc/7LLG-2QZC].
58 The Supreme Court broadened the indefiniteness standard after the lower court determinations in
Teva. See generally Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
59 Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 836.
60 Id.
61 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 723 F.3d 1363,

[h tE_/ eyma.cc /YP76-VCYT].
62 Teva, 135 S.Ct. at 836.
63 Id.at 835.
64 Id.

1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
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certain categories of factual findings[, including] both subsidiary and
ultimate
facts [and to findings made by a] district court sitting without a
65
jury.
The Court noted that its Markman decision "neither created, nor argued
for, an exception to Rule 52(a), 66 and recognized that "subsidiary
factfinding is sometimes necessary" in patent claim construction,67 directly
contradicting nearly two decades of Federal Circuit jurisprudence. The
majority recognized that while "[c]onstruction of written instruments often
presents a 'question solely of law,' at least when the words in those
instruments are 'used in their ordinary meaning,"' extrinsic evidence may
help when "a written instrument uses 'technical words or phrases not
commonly understood. ",68 "And in that circumstance, the 'determination of
the matter of fact' will 'preced[e]' the 'function of construction.' . . . This
factual determination, like
all other factual determinations, must be
6
reviewed for clear error.
The Supreme Court noted that clear error review is "'particularly'
important" in patent cases because "so much depends upon familiarity with
specific scientific problems and principles not usually contained in the
general storehouse of knowledge and experience. ' 70 The Court further
emphasized that "[a] district court judge who has presided over, and
listened to, the entirety of a proceeding has a comparatively greater
opportunity to gain that familiarity than an appeals court judge who must
read a written2 transcript
or perhaps just those portions to which the parties
71
have referred.
Building on its Markman framework, the Supreme Court's Teva
decision endorses a hybrid standard of appellate review that is balanced,
structurally sound, and legally appropriate. Under this hybrid standard,
65 Id. at 836-37

(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74

[hps pe a_._ccN2MQ _TGUJ];Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
[https//perma.cc/8PPA-YJLP]) (internal quotation marks omitted).

456

U.S.

273,

287

(1985)
(1982)

66 Id.at 837.

67 Id.at 838. The Court noted that its Markman decision "referred to claim construction as a
practice with 'evidentiary underpinnings,' a practice that 'falls
somewhere between a pristine legal
standard and a simple historical fact"' and "sometimes" required courts to make "'credibility judgments'
about witnesses." Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378, 388, 389-90
(1996)).
68 Id.at 837.

69 Id.(quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291-92 (1922)
[4pp//peria.cc/GT7 1EI.EMEV]) (alternation in original) (internal citations omitted).
70 Id.at 838 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)
[http:/perma.cc/99RA-GWAN]) (internal quotations omitted).
71 Id. Justice Breyer referenced Judge O'Malley's dissent in Lighting Ballast contending that
"Federal Circuit judges 'lack the tools that district courts have available to resolve factual disputes fairly
and accurately,' such as questioning the experts, examining the invention in operation, or appointing a
court-appointed expert." Id.at 838-39 (quoting Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am.
Corp., 744 F.3d 1272, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (O'Malley, J.,
dissenting)).
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factual determinations underlying claim construction rulings are subject to
the "clearly erroneous" (or "abuse of discretion") standard of review, while
the Federal Circuit exercises de novo review over the ultimate claim
construction decision. In this manner, district judges can use their
distinctive vantage point and evidentiary tools to ferret out factual
underpinnings while the Federal Circuit can operate as a check on fidelity
to the patent instrument. Therefore, even though the Federal Circuit retains
de novo review of whether a trial court's construction of a patent claim
comports with the intrinsic evidence-the patent document and prosecution
history-the appellate court must nonetheless sustain the trial court's
subsidiary factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Thus, where the
intrinsic evidence does not resolve the meaning of a disputed patent claim
term, the district court's resolution, if adequately grounded in extrinsic
evidence, will control.72

III.

IMPLEMENTING THE TEVA REGIME: PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT

In order to realize the promise of effectiveness and transparency that
the Supreme Court sought in its Markman decision and garner the deference
contemplated by Rule 52(a) as stressed in Teva, district judges should (1)
delineate the disputed subsidiary factual questions prior to the Markman
proceeding, (2) conduct focused briefing with supporting expert
declarations and evidentiary hearings to create an adequate record for
resolving such disputes, and (3) prepare a careful Markman order
explaining the basis for their claim construction.
This process can be standardized through augmentation of the Patent
Local Rules used in many jurisdictions.73 Such rules provide for the
exchange of proposed terms for construction by specified dates. Thereafter,
the parties must meet and confer to narrow or resolve differences. If they
cannot resolve their differences, they must prepare a joint claim
construction and prehearing statement.7 4 Within three weeks of the joint
statement, the parties must simultaneously exchange proposed constructions
of each disputed claim term and references from the patent specification or
prosecution history that support its proposed construction and designate any
supporting extrinsic evidence.5
The Teva decision can be implemented most effectively by requiring
parties to specifically identify underlying disputed facts in connection with
72

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented on the ground that claim construction does not

involve fact-finding. Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized claim construction to
statutory construction. Id.
73 See generally PETER S. MENELL, ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL
GUIDE ch. 5

(Federal

Judicial

Center,

2d

ed.

2012),

available at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract id 2114398 [h tppeua.cc/PTV X-4FWC].
74 See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-1 [htqj/erma.cc/JU34-CGED].
75 See id. at 4-2.
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disputed claim terms and how those disputed facts relate to the intrinsic
evidence in the joint claim construction statement. The parties should also
designate their proposed means of resolving the factual disputes. The
district judge would then be in a position to structure the Markman hearing
so as to develop a proper record for making factual findings. For example,
the judge could request that the parties present expert testimony, with crossexamination. Following the hearing, the judge would then prepare an order
explaining her view of the intrinsic evidence and any subsidiary factual
findings. The Federal Circuit would then have a clear record of the basis for
the judge's claim construction as well as the judge's reasoning.
There is some risk that the Teva decision will result in greater cost and
delay as parties engage in escalating battles of the experts. Such problems,
however, are not unique to patent adjudication, although the technological
complexity of patent cases creates greater opportunity for such tactics.
District judges must be vigilant in emphasizing the centrality of the intrinsic
evidence and exercise due caution in entertaining extrinsic evidence. After
all, the Federal Circuit will scrutinize the district judge's decision to go
beyond the intrinsic evidence to interpret claim meaning.
It is important to recognize that although many terms in patent claims
are beyond a district judge's general experience, scientists and engineers
have relatively clear understandings within their fields. In fact, many of the
disputed terms that are appealed to the Federal Circuit are not technical
scientific terms but common terms that are disputed within the context of
the particular patent claim.7 Scientists or engineers who take unjustified
positions risk having federal judges impugn their credibility. Since their
testimony would not occur before a jury, district judges have substantial
leeway to press the experts to clarify their positions. Over time, this
possibility should have the desired effect of bringing parties closer together
in their allegations.
The Teva decision places a greater onus on district judges to
understand and explain how they parse claim language. The decision
affords them greater flexibility to use familiar tools for resolving factual
disputes-presentation of evidence and expert testimony. At the same time,
it demands that they delineate how disputed subsidiary facts relate to the
intrinsic evidence. Ultimately, this framework adds to the reliability of the
dispute resolution process by bringing better evidence, more careful
scrutiny, and fuller explication to bear on claim construction.
By carefully preparing for Markman hearings, selectively using
focused expert testimony to resolve disputed subsidiary facts, and clearly
explaining their reasoning, district judges have the ability to achieve the
goal of effective, transparent, and well-reasoned patent claim constructions.
As this process takes root, patent litigation will become more predictable
and understandable. We can also hope that more cases will settle sooner,
76 See Informal Deference, supra note 9, at 68.
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especially after Markman rulings.

IV. THE INTERPLAY OF PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND CLAIM
INDEFINITENESS POST-TEVA

The Teva decision also implicates appellate review and case77
management of claim indefiniteness, another salient patent law doctrine.
As noted above, the claim construction controversy in the Teva case
pertained to Sandoz's assertion of a claim indefiniteness invalidity defense.
Since the district judge upheld the validity of Teva's patenf and later
resolved infringement claims at a bench trial,79 the allocation of
decisionmaking authority between the judge and a jury with regard to
resolving the indefiniteness question as well as the scope of appellate
review of the claim indefiniteness determination did not surface.
Nonetheless, Teva informs those questions.
Like the standard of review of patent claim construction, the Federal
Circuit has viewed the standard of review of claim indefiniteness as a pure
question of law pursuant to the now overruled Cybor decision. In Atmel
Corp. v.Information Storage Devices, Inc.,"0 the Federal Circuit reasoned
that:
"A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn
from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims." See
PersonalizedMedia Communications, LLC v. International Trade Comm 'n,
161 F.3d 696, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Indefiniteness, therefore, like claim
construction, is a question of law that we review de novo. See id.at 702; cf
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (holding that claim construction is a question of law reviewed de
novo).81

In view of the Supreme Court's rejection of Cybor's de novo standard
of review of patent claim construction in Teva, there is good reason to
believe that a district judge's determination of claim indefiniteness would
also fall within the Rule 52(a)(6) framework on which the Supreme Court
relied. Under the Supreme Court's Nautilus decision, Section 112(b)
requires that "a patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and
prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty. 8 s2 Thus, like claim construction, the
district judge may well need to hear from skilled artisans and resolve
77 See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2120, 2125 (2014).
78

See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 578 (S.D.N.Y 2011)

[hts:pesrma.c c/483H-JNJT].
79 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 876 F. Supp. 2d 295 (S.D.N.Y 2012)
[htqp _/prma.cc/G6WK-37SA].
80 198 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999) [lettps p ma.cc/K3R3-SHVR].
81 Id. at 1378.
82 Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129.
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disputes in determining whether the claims are indefinite. And where
experts disagree, the court will be required to make subsidiary factual
findings based upon the credibility of the witnesses or tools available to
district judges. Hence, the lower court's factual findings are entitled to
deference by the Federal Circuit to the extent that the intrinsic evidence
does not control.
The Teva case also sheds light on the allocation of decisionmaking
authority between judge and jury. The majority confirmed that the Supreme
Court used the phrase "within the province of the court" in Markman to
create a distinct category of rulings with a factual basis that lie outside of
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury.83 Like claim construction, the
assessment of claim indefiniteness has no direct antecedent in pre-1791
cases.84 Moreover, the same functional considerations that led the Court to
place claim construction within the province of the court apply to
indefiniteness.85 Therefore, although claim indefiniteness ought not be
characterized as a pure question of law, it nonetheless falls exclusively
"within the province of the court."
Even though the question of claim indefiniteness is, like claim
construction, a question for the judge and not a jury, the evidentiary
standard for invalidity defenses is higher (clear and convincing evidence)
than for claim construction (preponderance of the evidence) due to the
Patent Act's presumption of validity.86 Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine
a scenario in which a judge were to decide that a term cannot be construed
under the preponderance standard but declines to hold that it is indefinite
due to the higher clear and convincing standard. This seems to be a
distinction without a difference, but it would nonetheless be prudent for a
district judge to state in finding a claim is indefinite that she does so by
clear and convincing evidence. In essence, the preponderance and clear and
convincing evidence standards collapse in this situation.
The upshot of these considerations is that district judges ought to
resolve the question of claim indefiniteness at the same stage that it
considers claim construction. This will economize judicial resources,
simplify patent litigation, and potentially increase settlement where
subsidiary factual underpinnings entitle the district judge's resolution to
deference on appeal.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's Teva decision brings the standard of review of
patent construction rulings into line with foundational juridical principles of
83 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 837-38 (2015).
84 Id. at 378-84.

85 See id. at 384-90.
86 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) [hpcerma.cc/NE65-RY9Mj; cf Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship,
131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244-51 (2011) [lts.// enma.cc/K8KH-QW66].
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appellate review, resolving one of the most divisive issues in patent
litigation over the past two decades. Its efficacy, however, depends
critically upon district judges earning deference for the right reasons.
District judges will need to implement effective procedures for ferreting out
subsidiary factual disputes bearing on claim construction, scour the intrinsic
evidence for contraindications, develop a sufficient evidentiary record for
resolving the dispute, and explain their analysis. To borrow a phrase from
grade school teachers, district courts must not merely record their answer;
they must "show their work." Such an approach holds the promise of
ensuring that claim construction integrates careful analysis of the intrinsic
evidence with reliable evidence, where needed, of how skilled artisans
understand patent claim terms.

